'Mind'

By Sean A. Miller

Introduction

What is the mind? The question has been attended to for nearly 2,500 years. Alas, what is the mind? In this manuscript I will utilize principles of language, philosophy, and psychology in order to address the question. My interest lies in examining the mind by how the use of imagination has influenced our use of language. In this manuscript I intend to challenge your beliefs about the mind.
Mankind has accomplished great feats in the 202,008 years we have been Homo Sapiens. Yet, with all of our intellectual power we have not come to understand the mind. The mind seems to be an abstraction; therefore, Homo sapiens have never grasped, touched, or felt the mind. Hence, no empirical evidence has granted its existence.
I will argue the human brain’s development of the frontal lobe containing the prefrontal cortex[1] plays a significant role in the human ability to simulate experience, create a pictographic language, a written language and speech. The prefrontal cortex can represent what the organism experienced by recalling images, and later recalling experience via spoken and written language.
I propose the existence of the mind is a product of language and image-recall as forms of intrapersonal communication. People in the vein of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes (to only mention three) were engrossed by their ability to intrapersonal communicate. They could not explain the phenomena, and the word ‘mind’ was invented to identify the mysterious faculties of brain.
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Imagination/Neuroscience

Around two-million B.C.E. the Homo Hablis possessed a 1.25 pound brain. 1800,000 years later in 200,000 B.C.E. the Homo Sapiens’ brain grew almost double in size, to nearly 3 pounds. With the larger brain, the Homo Sapien also developed a new structure, the frontal lobe (Gilbert, 2004). In the frontal lobe there is the prefrontal cortex, which among many faculties it can simulate experience (Gilbert, 2006). Yet, the prefrontal cortex is not solely responsibly for simulated experience. The frontal lobes are primarily used for reasoning and planning, modulate emotions and personality, voluntary body movements, and convert thoughts into words. Yet, the entire brain works in concert with different areas of the brain.
Harvard College Professor of Psychology, Daniel Gilbert wrote in his book Stumbling on Happiness, the frontal lobes are what allow humans to “experience the future” of “imaginary tomorrows” (Gilbert, 2006, p.16, 17). The behavioral neurologist and neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio wrote in his article, How the Brain Creates the Mind, “…the brain has a natural means to represent the structure and state of the whole living organism….the brain uses structures designed to map both the organism and external objects to create fresh, second-order presentation. This representation indicates that the organism, as mapped in the brain, is involved in interacting with an object, also mapped in the brain” (1999). Following the brains ability to simulate experience, Gilbert and Damasio are suggesting because humans can use the structure, the brain, in which it represents to represent another object; and in creating a second-order representing of another object, the human can image how its organism and the object may interact in the future. This is what Damasio calls the “movie-in-the-brain” metaphor. He writes, “This ‘movie’ is a metaphor for the integrated and unified composite of diverse sensory images—visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and others—that constitutes the multimedia show we call mind” (1999).
During the 2004 TED (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) conference, Daniel Gilbert said, “The research my laboratory has been doing, economists and psychologists around the country have been doing have revealed something quite startling to us. Something we call the “impact bias,” which is the tendency for the simulator to work badly—for the simulator makes you believe different outcomes are more different than they really are.” The prefrontal cortex has the ability to imitate or create a simulation of experience infers Homo Sapiens can imitate the process of examining and testing if a thing is true i.e., it simulates the appearance that we are in practical contact with facts and events, but without proof.

Language

There are a many different and contrasting theories as to how humans have a complex capacity for language. At the end of the day, no scientist has been able to prove any cause of the development of language. I am not interested in how the Homo Sapien became to construct the meanings of language and words. My interest lies in how the use of imagination has influenced our use of language.
The prefrontal cortex’s simulation faculty is related to the oldest structures and conventions of language, the cuneiform script. The cuneiform script was a form of pictographs that emerged from Sumer around the 30th century BC. The cuneiform script consisted of about 1,000 unique characters of simple pictorial representations of objects to abstract ideas. With the prefrontal cortex Homo Sapien could remember what they experienced and then simulate it in the form of a picture or pictographic script.
Written human language moved from pictures representing objects and abstract ideas into words that could be spoken represent the same objects and ideas with sound. The Homo Sapien expanded its versatility not only in how it communicates, but what it can communicate about. Jane Goodall spoke elegantly during the 2007 TEDGlobal (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) conference about humans’ ability to use language. She said,
The one thing we have that makes us so different from chimpanzees or
other living creates is the sophisticated spoken language; a language
with which we can tell children about things that are not here. We can
talk about the distant past, plan for the distant future, discuss
ideas with each other so the ideas can grow through the accumulated
wisdom of a group. We can do it by talking to each other; we can do it
through … the written word(Goodall, 2007).
With the use of language humans could not only simulate experience, they would communicate their simulations about the past and the future to others. However, one faculty Jane Goodall does not mention is our sophisticated language being used for intrapersonal communication or self-talk. Intrapersonal communication uses language as a feedback system to send and receive messages as a means of problem-solving. “In Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry, Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson argue that intrapersonal communication as ‘dialogue is the foundation for all discourse’” (Intrapersonal communication, 2008).

Intrapersonal Communication & Self-Awareness

As Jurgen Ruesch wrote that intrapersonal communication is the foundational dialogue for all discourse, then perhaps the founders of the philosophy of the mind also used this method for their theoretical approach. Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes must have used their own intrapersonal communication to theorize and conceived the mind. How are these three philosophers talking to themselves having anything to do with analyzing “what is the mind’?
Descartes wrote, “I think therefore I am.” Plato stated, “Thinking: the talking of the soul with itself.” Conceivably these men, these thinkers, talked to themselves quieting and “invisibly”. They expressed information within themselves by using the language they spoke with, wrote with, and even in with which they thought. Therefore, as the definition alludes, the language of these philosophers (and everyone who uses language) uses words in a structural and conventional way. Language as a convention means it follows a tradition, or transmission of costumes or beliefs—ways of behaving or doing something—that are deployed as a means of achieving something.
Plato and Aristotle were not interested in knowing about the mind, but knowing about the self; yet, these three men didn’t define what the mind is or how the mind may be identified. The conception of the mind derived from the Greek word ‘psykhe,’ in which English derived the Latin word psyche, means "the soul, mind, spirit, breath, life, the invisible animating principle or entity which occupies and directs the physical body (Psyche, 2008). The psyche refers to an invisible animating principle. How is some thing invisible discovered? How did Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes identify and discover the mind, if it is invisible? These three men were not empirical about their thoughts about the mind. They had no means of measuring their hypotheses other than speaking to one another. Their means for investigation was introspection[2]. By thinking, they conceived of the mind.
How did these men ever think the word ‘mind’ or ‘soul’? As I mentioned, the prefrontal cortexes ability to simulate experience only simulates observed facts and events. Therefore, if the mind and soul can not be observed because they are invisible, the prefrontal cortex can not simulate the experience of mind or soul. If the mind and soul can not be simulated because they can not be observed, then what is being experienced which is being called ‘mind’ and ‘soul’? As Damasio wrote, “…the brain has a natural means to represent the structure and state of the whole living organism” (1999). Therefore, Plate, Aristotle and Descartes were experiencing their organism being aware of its self. As Damasio wrote, “The self-aware organism has an incentive to heed the alarm signals provided by the movie-in-the-brain (for instance, pain caused b a particular object) and plan the future avoidance of such an object. Evolution of self rewards awareness, which is clearly a survival advantage” (1999). Although the earlier philosophers were primarily interested in spiritual rationale for experiencing their self, the self-experience is primal and integrated with the body.
As I mentioned before in reference to Plato, Aristotle and Descartes (among others) believed they knew about their thinking. They had no proof about what caused their thinking other than through thinking. Perhaps this conclusion is what provoked Descartes to claim, “I think, therefore I am.” As Daniel Gilbert said, “[this is] something we call the ‘impact bias,’ which is the tendency for the simulator to work badly--for the simulator makes you believe different outcomes are more different than they really are.” ”(2004). Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes didn’t know their simulators worked badly. And often times neither does anyone else. Therefore, Descartes claim “I think, therefore I am” is an unclear explanation of self-awareness. “I am” is constant whether thought is present. What Descartes may literally means “I think, therefore I think I am.” Descartes claim is an objective statement about his subjectivity. Yet, when one endeavors to objectify their subjectivity via believing one can simulate the simulator, self-awareness is not achieved through simulating the simulator or thinking about thinking.
Self-awareness is experienced through thinking and/or simulating; therefore self-awareness is not an activity to be experienced, it is the human experience of the self.

Conclusion

Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes (among many others) developed their theories of mind based on the belief their intrapersonal communication was a reliable source proof about…anything. However, without empirical evidence that grants the existence of mind, theories of the mind contain an “impact bias.”
I propose the existence of the mind is a product of language and image-recall as forms of intrapersonal communication. People in the vein of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes (to only mention three) could not explain the phenomena of their organism’s self-awareness, and the words ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ were invented to identify the mysterious faculties of brain that represents itself and other objects.
I put forward, the ‘mind’ is a product of imagination plus a form of linguistics. Our personal understanding about the mind is dependent upon our pattern or convention of beliefs in which we choose to experience our subjective existence of thinking. Therefore, ‘mind’ exists when one desires to simulate a system of pictographic or linguistic thought onto their direct sense-experience. ‘Mind’ does not exist when one is merely aware of their senses, without simulating a system of pictographic or linguistic thought onto their direct sense-experience. The beliefs we create from our experience via thought are simulations, imposing meaning onto an existence, void of inherent meaning. Imagination and linguistics impose meaning on to experience, creating the necessity for ‘mind’; without imagination and linguistics the ‘mind’ will not exist.


References:

Damasio, Antnio R. (1999) How the Brain Creates the Mind. Scientific America,
Inc. Issue Decemeber, 1999 p.4-9

Gilbert, Daniel. (2004) Why are we happy? Why aren't we happy? Proceedings from TED ’04: Technology, Entertainment, and Design, Money and Desire. New York, New York: U.S.A.

Gilbert, D. (2006). Stumbling on happiness. New York: Random House, Inc.
Goodall, Jane (2002). What separates us from the apes? Proceedings from TEDGlobal ’02: Technology, Entertainment, and Design, Africa: The Next Chapter: Learning from Nature. Arusha, Tanzania: Africa.
Intrapersonal communication. (2008, October 27). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 23:46, November 29, 2008, from (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Intrapersonal_communication&oldid=248074640)

Introspection. (n.d.) In Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English. Retrieved December 13, 2008. from http://www.askoxford.com

Pyche. (n.d.) In Online Etymology Online. Retrieved November 14, 2003.
from http://www.etymonline.com

[1] c. 200,000 BCE (Gilbert, 2004).
[2] “ noun the examination of one’s own thoughts or feelings” (Introspection, 2008).

Desirability of Exchanges in Particularism & Ideal Romantic Relationships

Desirability of Exchanges in Particularism & Ideal Romantic Relationships:
What’s love got to, got to do with it?
Sean Miller and Caitlin Hawthorne
Guilford College

Many people are involved in what is known as a romantic relationship. Those who are in romantic relationships may also claim they are “in love”. As Tina Turner sang in 1993, we also wonder, “What’s love got to, got to do with it?” Psychoanalyst Erich Fromm wrote in his book The Sane Society, “Love is often nothing but a favorable exchange between two people who get the most of what they can expect, considering their value on the personality market” (Fromm, 1956, p. 147). Is love nothing but a favorable exchange between two people? What is the romantic exchange of what we call “love”?
A general definition of the word ‘romantic’ is “marked by the imaginative or emotional appeal of what is heroic, adventurous, remote, mysterious or idealized” (Merriam-Webster, 2007). Romantic relationships, if truly romantic, are marked by an imaginative and emotional appeal. In Daniel Gilbert’s book Stumbling on Happiness, he suggests imagination is the faculty that allows us to see into the future (Gilbert, 2006). Gilbert further suggests the shortcoming of imagination is also the shortcoming of memory, the faculty that allows us to see the past (Gilbert, 2006). Romanticism is also marked by emotionality, which is a subjective perception toward neutral object stimuli and being projected as either “good” or “bad” in relation to the subjective perceiver.
In addition, Fromm suggests peoples’ interest in love (i.e. romantic relationships) is drawn by the “favorable exchange between two people” (1956, p.147). Favorable exchange is a sociological construct under the umbrella of what sociologists call exchange theory. Exchange theory is based on the idea that a relationship involves costs and benefits. Exchange theory suggests those who give resources expect to receive a certain amount of resources in return for their giving. For example, when a person perceives the costs in a relationship as outweighing the perceived benefits, then the theory implies the giver will choose to discontinue the relationship. The behaviors exchanged between the persons involved can be identified as reinforcers. Reinforcers are resources offered or given (positive) to the receiver, who is expected to return the same or similar resources. Reinforcers that are removed from a situation are considered negative.
The reinforcing resources can range from symbolic to concrete. Turner, Foa, & Foa (1971) created a taxonomy of reinforcers within a range of symbolic and concrete classifications. Turner, Foa, & Foa’s taxonomy included six interpersonal resources (from symbolic to concrete): love (an “expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort”), status (expressions of “evaluative judgment, which conveys high or low prestige, regard or esteem”), information (which included “advice, opinions, and instruction”), services (including “activities on the body or belongings of a person which constitutes labor for another”), goods (“tangible products, objects, or materials”); money (“any coin, currency, or token which has some standard unit of exchange value”).
Exchange theory requires a relationship of at least two. Within a romantic relationship the giver and receiver are constantly in flux. Turner, Foa, & Foa (1971) were also interested in looking at with whom one exchanges. They hypothesized the value of resources as being contingent upon the particular person who delivers the reinforcer. Turner, Foa, & Foa named this dimension particularism. In 1970, Zick Rubin also considered an idea of particularism in a study concerning the measure of romantic love (Rubin, 1970). Rubin states an initial assumption as, “ love is an attitude held by a person toward a particular other person, involving predispositions to think, feel, and behave in certain ways toward that other person” (Rubin, 1970). The particular person with whom one relates seems to be an important factor within the romantic relationship. Rubin (1970) references Fromm to support the claim of particularism. Rubin (1970) states individuals choose a particular target to love based on the other’s personality, which transcends particular persons and situations.
Rubin, Fromm, and Turner, Foa, & Foa, all claim particularism is a key factor in whom one chooses to engage in a romantic relationship. The particularism is then associated with an idea of love, or idealized and emotionalized personality traits, which transcend particular persons and situations, which we will call non-particularism. However, what idealized and emotionalized persons and situations does love transcend?
The idealized person and situation of a romantic relationship is a constructed image, which is formed by a previously imagined model of ideal characteristics found in a particular mate. One’s current ideal mate is based on previous experiences of an ideal mate. As Daniel Gilbert (2006) claims humans fail to accurately see the past as well as the future because humans base their current perception of the past and present on understandings of the present. He also claims humans mistakenly misperceive the present due to how our memories construct our past. Uniquely, Gilbert provides an example, that when dating couples try to recall what they thought about their previous romantic relationship in previous months, the partners based their opinion on what they feel about them at the present moment (Gilbert, 2006). Since our past is constructed of memories with numerous gaps of information which we fill-in with inaccurate but related information, our memories are constructed of semi-false understanding of the past (Gilbert, 2006). Therefore, our idea of the past is a product of filling in our memory gaps by imaging an ideal mate. Judging by Gilbert’s claims (2006), understanding the subjective experience seems to be impossible. But, as Gilbert writes, “it’s the only game in town” (2006, p.77).
The human imagination has great potential to influence the romantic relationship. If imagination is constantly creating an illusion, how might we understand what people are currently engaged with while behaving in a romantic relationship? To discuss this question we will return to the symbolic and concrete exchanges based on the exchange theory.
Once two people choose each other as particular partners to be together in a romantic relationship, what are they doing within that relationship? People within a relationship prefer an equal amount and quality of exchanged resources (Turner, Foa, & Foa, 1971). Based on the taxonomy of reinforcing resources, when the resources are not equal in amount and quality people prefer more similar reinforcers to dissimilar reinforcers (Turner, Foa & Foa, 1971).
The simple preferred exchange of resources does not fully explain the relationship between cost and benefits within the romantic relationship. Relational satisfaction is related to how the resources are exchanged. The equity of exchange in resources is a factor in relational satisfaction (Dainton, 2003). Research has shown that a feeling of inequity determines emotional reactions within relational satisfaction. Those who are over benefited express emotions such as guilt and anger, while those who are under benefited express depression and frustration (Dainton, 2003). Those who are under benefited experienced relationship uncertainty, the lack of confidence pertaining to their involvement within the relationship (Dainton, 2003). Conversely, being over benefited was not related to relationship uncertainty (Dainton, 2003).
Thus, an emotional response to the inequity of exchanged resources is a factor in relational satisfaction. Further, the preferred exchange is also particular to the persons with whom we choose to exchange. As previously stated, although choosing a particular partner may be a product of our imaginary ideal partner, the exchange of resources with the particular partner is an important determinant to relational satisfaction. We know the equity of exchange is a preferred and a determinant of romantic relationships’ satisfaction. However, our interest lies in the relation to how the inequity of reinforcers and perceived particularism factor into the desirable involvement in a romantic relationship. Further, we are also interested in how the quantity of inequity factors into the desirable involvement in a romantic relationship.
Our current interest is measuring people’s desired involvement in inequitable romantic relations. We are also interested in how particularism influences the desirability of involvement in an equitable romantic relationship. As Dainton (2003) shows, those who are under benefited experience emotions of depression and frustation, while those who experience over benefitedness experience emotions of guilt and anger. However, those who experience over benefitedness also experience less relational uncertainty as well as perceiving their relational inequity (Dainton, 2003). Therefore, we have no reason to believe people will desire to be under benefited in either particular or non-particular romantic relationships.
Due to non-particularism’s relation to an imagined, ideal partner, we hypothesize people will desire to be over benefited in a future romantic relationships due to its perceived satisfaction. We theorize, as Gilbert (2006) claims, views of past romantic relationships reference the present; the particularism of a previous mate will indicate how a partner currently conceptualizes romantic relationships. Therefore, we further hypothesize particularism will also be positively associated with the desire to be over benefited.

Methods

Participants

We will collect data from 40 students (20 male and 20 female) from a small, liberal arts college in North Carolina. These participants, whether they are traditional students, continuing college education students (CCE), or early college students will be at least 18 years of age. Participants will be collected through a convenient sample from the small, liberal arts college Psychology Department composed for their Research Methods classes. Each individual will be randomly assigned to either the particular or non-particular “condition” in combination with being over benefited or under benefited. Each participant will be asked to disclose their gender, age, and if they are currently in a romantic relationship and/or when their most recent romantic relationship ended. All participants will also be asked to complete an Informed Consent Form agreeing to participate in the study.

Materials

Turner, Foa, & Foa’s (1971) taxonomy of resources (love, status, information, services, goods and money) indicate that more distal reinforcers are less preferred to more proximal reinforcers. Therefore, in measuring inequity the reinforcers most distal will be valued as less desirable. Generating the likeness of inequity for the participant they will either be under benefited or over benefited in each rated situation. When the participant is under benefited the resources received will be more distal and lesser than equal value than the resources given. Conversely, when the participant is over benefited the resources received will be of greater value than the resource given.
We simulated the participants being under benefited as reinforcers are more distal from love. All four variations of the survey (see Appendices A-D) will consist of 15 situations. Each question will convey a distal relationship and depending on the survey, all situations will portray either over benefitedness (Appendices A-B) or under benefitedness (Appendices C-D). Those participants receiving the over benefited surveys (whether they are particular or non-particular does not matter) will read scenarios that over benefit them in their romantic relationship and participants receiving the under benefited surveys will read the same scenarios but flipped to create scenarios that under benefit the participant in their romantic relationship. An example question is as follows: “You tell your partner, ‘You smell nice!’ and in response, s/he wraps their arms around you.” Based on this example, we convey the relationship as being over benefited because the giver is providing “status” (the compliment of smelling nice), but the receiver is giving “love” (wrapping their arms around you) as received in return. All situations in each pair of conditions will contain a variety of exchanged resources however, since we are focusing on romantic relationships, all situations will have love as one of the resources being exchanged. In the under benefited surveys, love will be given and a more distal resource will be received. Conversely, in the over benefited surveys, love will be received and a more distal resource will be given.
All participants will rate each situation based on their desirability to be involved in the presented relationship, which contains this exchange. They will rate the questions based on an interval 7-point Likert scale. The Likert scale will range from 1 as being ‘very strongly undesirable,’ to 7 as being ‘very strongly desirable’ including 4 for “Neutral”. In order to calculate the overall value of desirability the participants rated the fifteen scenarios, we will add all the rated numeric values skipping over “4” which is Neutral. Our system will provide a range of possible desirability score from 0-105.
In order to manipulate the second factor (particularism and non-particularism), we asked the participants to write a few sentences, either, describing a past or ideal romantic relationship (see Appendices A-D).

Procedures

Our first interest is determining how the perceptions of particularism influence relational inequity in the exchange of reinforcers. We must first simulate particularism. Although we will be unable to simulate a romantic relationship, we will be able to employ Gilbert’s (2006) theory pertaining to the imagined present. Rather than asking participants about their present relationship--which they may or may not be involved--we will ask the participants to respond to the questionnaire as they think they might respond in a previous romantic relationship as well as in an ideal future romantic relationship.
In order to measure the influence of particularism we will ask the participants to respond to a previous romantic partner, and as Gilbert (2006) claims, people will reference the present preferences as if they were remembering their past. In attempts to balance Gilbert, we will also ask a second group of participants to answer the same survey as they might in an ideal future romantic relationship, which we will use as the non-particularistic variable. Further, in asking the participants to consider the past and the future we hope to gain a closer representation of their present thinking. We hope this variable difference, particularism versus non-particularism, will reveal imagined behavioral discrimination in romantic particularism.
Secondly, the participants will be asked to complete one of four surveys to which they are randomly assigned. The four surveys are coded and separated to combine one level of one independent variable, and one level of the other independent variable. Therefore, one survey represents particularism paired with over benefitedness, one represents particularism paired with under benefitedness, one represents non-particularism paired with over benefitedness, and one represents non-particularism paired with under benefitedness. At the beginning of each survey, participants are asked if they have ever been involved in a romantic relationship and if they are currently involved in a romantic relationship. Depending on which survey they receive, particular or non-particular, participants will be asked to write a short paragraph describing their most previous –but not current – romantic relationship or to write a short paragraph describing their ideal – but not current – romantic relationship. Upon completion, participants, using a 15-item instrument, rate (using a 7-point Likert scale) their desire of involvement in the romantic relationship just described in response to descriptions of a series of situational-exchange of reinforcers. Depending on which survey they receive, these exchange situations will either over benefit or under benefit the participant. Our desirability scale will be an adaptation of Knobloch and Solomon's (2001) measures of self, partner, and relationship uncertainty scale. The questionnaire will include the following instructions for the particular group: “Using the rating scale below, we would like you to rate the extent to which the exchange situations described is desirable to you. To answer these questions, think about how you would respond in the romantic relationship you previously described;” and for the non-particular group we will include the following instructions: “Using the rating scale below, we would like you to rate the extent to which the exchange-situations described is desirable to you. To answer these questions, think about how you would respond in the romantic relationship you previously described.”
The participants will be responding to a methodically generated value of reinforcers in each question, which there will be a (interval) range of inequity within the exchange. We will use Turner, Foa, & Foa’s (1971) taxonomy of reinforcing resources in order to calculate the value of inequity within each situation (over benefited versus under benefited). At the end of all four variations of the survey, participants will be asked to answer whether or not they believe the situational-exchange scenarios they just read were of equal value. If not, they are to identify how they think they benefited in the exchanges (either under benefited or over benefited). Finally, participants are asked their gender and age.

Results

Fifty-nine people (22 male, 37 female) participated in our study. Of these participants, 38 were currently in a romantic relationship and 21 were not. The age of participants ranged from 16 to 54 with a mean age of 24.84 (SD = 9.64); one participant did not provide this information. With a maximum desirability score of 105, participant desirability scores ranged from 5 to 91 with a mean desirability score of 50.10 (SD = 17.95); one participant did not provide this information.
A 2 (benefitedness) X 2 (particularism) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine participant’s desirability to be over benefited or under benefited in terms of particularism or non-particularism. There was no significant difference in desirability of benefitedness for participants who thought of a particular (past) relationship (M = 49.64, SD = 18.95) surveys, F (1, 54) = 0.03, p = ns, h squared = 0.001. There was no significant difference in desirability of benefitedness for participants who thought of a non-particular (future ideal) relationship (M = 50.50, SD = 17.28) surveys, F (1, 54) = 2.78, p = ns, h squared = 0.001. Additionally, there was no significant interaction between particularism and benefitedness, F (1, 54) = 0.16, p = 0.901, h squared = 0.00. The effect of particularism was not influenced by whether participants desired to be over benefited or under benefited, thus disproving our hypothesis.
A total of 59 (29 under benefited, 30 over benefited) participants completed surveys. Out of 59 (29 under benefited, 30 over benefited), 20 participants perceived they were under benefited and 23 participants perceived they were over benefited. That is 33.9% of the participants perceived to be under benefited, 39% of the participants perceived to over benefited, and 27.1 percent perceived the exchanges to be equal.
In order to better understand the range of perceived equity of exchanges in the rated scenarios, we examined particularism with how the participant perceived the equity in the rated exchanges. Therefore, a 2 (how did you feel benefited) X 2 (particularism) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine the factors that impact participant’s desirability to be in a romantic relationship in terms of hypothesized particularism and how the participant personally felt benefited (over or under). There was no significant difference in desirability to be in a particular romantic relationship and how the participant personally felt benefited (M = 45.11, SD = 16.50), F (1, 39) = 0.31, p = ns, h squared = 0.01. There was no significant difference in desirability to be in a non-particular romantic relationship and how the participant personally felt benefited (M = 50.25, SD = 17.25), F (1, 39) = 0.62, p = ns, h squared = 0.02.
However, there was a significant interaction between how the participant personally felt benefited and particularism, F (1, 39) = 4.13, p = 0.05, h squared = 0.01. This interaction accounted for 10% of the variance in desirability. Results indicated that participants who personally felt under benefited reported higher desirability scores (M = 55.33, SD = 19.48) than participants who personally felt over benefited (M = 40.38, SD = 13.28) when given particular surveys. The opposite effect was found for participant’s who received non-particular surveys. These participants reported higher desirability scores when they felt personally over benefited (M = 54.10, SD = 17.26) rather than when they felt personally under benefited (M = 47.50, SD = 17.34).

Discussion

The results of the present study did not support our hypotheses. We hypothesized particularism (thinking about a past relationship) will be positively associated with the desire to be over benefited. Further, due to our theorization about non-particularism (an imagined, ideal partner), we hypothesize people will desire to be over benefited due to a foreseen satisfaction. We did not find people desired to be over benefited when considering a past relationship. We also did not find people desired to be over benefited when considering an imagined, ideal relationship.
I order to explain what we did find about human behavior as it is associated with past and future relationships as well as benefitedness, we will explain how our hypothetical constructs of particularism and benefitedness may have strongly differed from our participants.
After turning the two-way ANOVA to examine participant’s desirability to be over benefited or under benefited in terms of particularism or non-particularism, and found not significant data, we questioned the reliability and internal validity of our independent variables manipulations. Order to discover if a manipulation occurred, we did two things. First, we ran descriptives on the participants’ perception of how they felt benefited. What we discovered was the participants did not report feeling benefited in the manner in which we manipulated benefitedness. That is, out of a 59 (29 under benefited, 30 over benefited) participants, 33.9% of the participants perceived to be under benefited, 39% of the participants perceived to be over benefited, and 27.1 % perceived the exchanges to be equal. Based these descriptives, we realized we were unable to manipulate how the participants perceived being benefited.
Although, as Daniel Gilbert (2006) claims humans fail to accurately see the past as well as the future because humans base their current perception of the past and present on understandings of the present, we put question to how our participants perceived the desirability when examining particularism with how the participant perceived the equity in the rated exchanges. We found when our participants were asked to consider past relationships their desirability of the exchanges were significantly higher, yet reported they felt under benefited. Similarly, we found when participants were asked to consider a future, ideal relationship their desirability of the exchanges were significantly higher, yet reported they felt over benefited.
By finding the results between the interactions of how our participants perceived the desirability when examining particularism with how the participant perceived the equity in the rated exchanges, we questioned if our participants were actually referencing the present while rating the exchange scenarios. However, we can only guess that by having the participants write about a past or future relationship, they were referencing their imagination. As questioned previously, if imagination is constantly creating an illusion, how might we understand what people are currently engaged with while behaving in a romantic relationship?
In order to discuss the question we will return to the symbolic and concrete exchanges based on the exchange theory. As previously stated, an emotional response to the inequity of exchanged resources is a factor in relational satisfaction. Further, the preferred exchange is also particular to the persons with whom we choose to exchange. Although choosing a particular partner may be a product of an imaginary partner, the exchange of resources with the particular partner is an important determinant to relational satisfaction. We know the equity of exchange is a preferred and a determinant of romantic relationships’ satisfaction. However, our interest lies in the relation to how the inequity of reinforcers and perceived particularism factor into the desirable involvement in a romantic relationship.
Due to our manipulation of benefitedness not being perceived by the participants, we infer the participants did not assess benefitedness in the same way we operationalized it. Although we can not be certain as to how our participants valued each exchange, we can make four deductions. First, we believe the participants did not value the exchanges, based on Turner, Foa, & Foa (1971) taxonomy of reinforcing resources, as being more or less desirable due to a taxonomic distance of equality. We think the participants did not value the exchange of reinforcing resources by valuing them as symbolic more valuable than concrete. Secondly, due to operationalizing a value system based on Turner, Fao and Fao (1971), we did not generate a value system based on an exchange of more than one resource. The manipulation of benefitedness might have been perceived if the number of input reinforces were more or fewer than the output reinforcers. Thirdly, as romanticism is marked by emotionality (a subjective perception toward neutral object stimuli and being projected as either “good” or “bad” in relation to the subjective perceiver), we were unable to determine how or why our participants were emotionalizing the exchange of reinforcers. Perhaps it was the emotionality people projected onto the scenarios in order to rate them which might be the largest unaccounted for subjectivity. Lastly, there is one other potential possibility for how might be able to understand why participants considered past relationships a high desirability of the exchanges and reported they felt under benefited, and when participants were asked to consider a future, ideal relationship their desirability of the exchanges were high, yet reported they felt over benefited. As Dainton (2003) mentions, there are three ways in which people attempt to equalize perceived inequity in romantic relationships. Dainton (2003, p. 166) writes people do one of three things: they either change their own behavior in a relationship; generate in a “psychological distortion to change equity calculations;” or leave the relationship. Due to our participants’ inability to change their behavior or leave the relationship they are considering while rating the scenarios of the survey, our conjecture is that our participants “engaged in psychological distortion to change equity calculations” (Dainton, 2003, p. 166).
We believe there is strong indication person engage in psychological distortion to change the equity calculations” (Dainton, 2003, p. 166) due to Dainton’s (2003) research having shown feelings of inequity determines emotional reactions within relational satisfaction. Those who are over benefited express emotions such as guilt and anger, while those who are under benefited express depression and frustration (Dainton, 2003). Further, as emotional responses to inequitable exchanges is a factor in relational satisfaction, and emotionality creates a subjective perception toward neutral object stimuli and being projected as either “good” or “bad” in relation to the subjective perceiver, then psychological distortion is unpredictable. We are uncertain as to what exchange of reinforces or if how many exchange reinforcers will cause what kind of emotion in subjects.
Therefore, in future studies, we may gain a behavioral understanding from asking participants to report what emotion they might expect to experience when experiencing a series of reinforcer exchanges. We could manipulate the range of different distal reinforcers as well as the number of input reinforces were more or fewer than the output reinforcers. Although we are unable to expect how our participants will psychologically distort the equity exchange, we might predict people will report “good” emotions when they feel under benefited in a past relationship and people will also report “good” emotions when they feel over benefited in a future, ideal relationship. However, we merely make this prediction with the assumption based on the fact our participants’ will be unable to change their behavior or leave the relationship they are considering while rating the scenarios of the survey; thus, the participants may continue to experience a subjective psychological distortion toward the equity calculations, which may continue to have cause a lack of correlation between inequity and the participants’ emotional response.


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